Kraków 2017-03-20
The accident of the Su-22 nb 3818 aircraft. 1995-04-04.
The history of the purchase of Su-22 M 4 K and Su-22 UM 3 K aircraft for the Polish Army.
The outbreak of the Second Cold War at the beginning of the 1980s forced the rearmament of the Warsaw Pact countries. In Poland, MiG-23 MF planes were introduced to the service of fighter aviation in a limited number and, for financial reasons, to two MiG-21 bis regiments. However, the real retooling took place in the fighter-bomber (assault) aviation. And in terms of quality and quantity. The assault Lim-6 bis used until then was far from sufficient.
The Su-22 M 3 competed with the MiG-23 BN for deliveries to Poland. In 1982, the Sukhoi plane was selected for economic reasons, and the Su-7 and Su-20 used in Poland indicated that the line would be continued. However, the purchase decision was not made.
In 1983, the CCCP proposed to buy a newer version of the aircraft, namely the Su-22 M 4, and then an order was placed for 80 Su-22 M 4 and 20 Su-22 UM 3 K for two fighter-bomber regiments and two squadrons 7 BLR-B ( Bomber and Reconnaissance Aviation Brigade).
We purchased Su-22 planes in two versions; single-seat Su-22 M 4 K and two-seat Su-22 M 3 K. In 1985, we received the first, respectively 20 and 6 pieces. In total, we bought 90 and 20 pieces, which made 110 pieces in total, i.e. equipment for three aviation regiments. In 1986, 10 Su-22 M 4 were ordered in order to equip the third regiment with this type of machine (8 PLM-B from Mirosławiec) in place of two 7 BLBR squadrons (the Su-20 remained in it). The initial plans to convert into Su-22 planes of the 45th Regiment based in Babimost were not implemented. This task surpassed the poor country, ruled ineffectively by the communists.
In the period August-October 1984, the first 13 aircraft reached Powidz on board the Il-76 and An-12/22. There were 7 Su-22 M 4 machines (nb 3005, 3212, 3213, 3908, 3909, 3910, 3911) and 6 training-combat Su-22 UM 3 K machines (104, 305, 306, 307, 308, 509). All of them were part of the 6th PLM-B (Fighter-Bomber Regiment) in Piła. In August 1985, 40 PLM-B from Świdwin received its first Su-22, and in May 1986, the third squadron of 7 PLB-R (bomber and reconnaissance aviation regiment) from Powidz (initially this squadron was to be part of 8 PLM-B in Mirosławiec).
In May 1985, the first group of Polish pilots went to Krasnodar for training on new equipment. They returned in July 1985. Some of the first pilots were; Lt. Col. Bogdan Likus, Lt. Col. Pilot Jan Kania and Lt. Col. Zenon Jankowski (a double of the Polish cosmonaut of General Mirosław Hermaszewski).
Deliveries of the Su-22 were carried out differently than the Su-20 that just flew in 10 years earlier. The Su-22 was delivered to Powidz in boxes. Here CCCP soldiers assembled and flew the equipment themselves. Only then did they hand them over to the Polish side. Probably the first Polish Su-22 M 4 soldier of CCCP in Powidz already flew on May 5, 1984 and the machine was demonstrated to representatives of the Polish Ministry of National Defense. The technical service life of the Polish Su-22 during the peace period was 20-25 years. The last 10 machines were assembled at Świdwin Airport.
The first period of use of the new machines fell in the second half of the 1980s. Polish pilots mastered the pilot relatively quickly. The training with the use of the new p-z class guided armament (air-to-ground, air-to-water, and in accordance with the changed air-surface nomenclature) was particularly important. Since the Polish state was strongly in the UW, the tasks set for the new machines remained unchanged.
The socio-political changes in Poland started in 1989 resulted in pressure from Poland to join the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), which finally took place in 1999. But from the beginning of the 90s, Poland was looking for its subjectivity in new conditions. This manifested itself, inter alia, in making contacts with recent opponents. In 1995, pilots from Powidz on Su-22 planes visited the Swedish base in Satenas for the first time.
As of January 1, 1991, we had 85 Su-22 M 4 K and 19 Su-22 UM 3 K in service. We lost 2 pilots (Hello Their Memory!) And 3 Su-22 M 4 K and 1 Su -22 UM 3 K. The accident rate was not greater than that of other types. Not many accidents happened. By 2007, we lost a total of 8 pilots (Hello To Their Memory!) And 12 machines, including two two-seater. But, a new plane can be bought. However, it is impossible to buy a second life of a pilot and dry the tears shed by loved ones. The first to die on the Su-22 was Lieutenant Pilot Bogusław Siwiec, on October 23, 1986, at 22:37. The Su-22 M 4 nb 7104 aircraft No. 27104.
The accident of the Su-22 nb 3818 No. 37818.
The Su-22 nb 3818 aircraft No. 37818 arrived in Poland in 1987. It was put into service with 8 PLM-B in Mirosławiec. On April 4, 1995, 8th PLM-B was making regimental flights. The Su-22 nb 3818 aircraft participated in these flights. In the afternoon, a briefing and training for pilots took place in the cabins of TS-11 Iskra and Su-22 aircraft. On that day, some pilots made two flights. The first flight on the TS-11 Iskra, the second on the Su-22.
The pilot of the Su-22 nb 3818 aircraft first performed a flight on the TS-11 Iskra between 16:00 - 16:45, taking a seat in the second cabin. The second flight, on the same day, was performed by the pilot himself in the cabin of the Su-22 nb 3818. The task was to fly according to exercise 24 of the Aviation Training Program on Su-20 and Su-22 aircraft from 1994, in a zone 45 km east of the airport Mirosławiec.
The weather on that day in the area of Mirosławiec Airport, according to official data, was as follows; cloudiness 3/10, cloud base 1 200 m, upper cloud 2 000 - 3 000 m, wind from 300 degrees (west) 7-12 m / s, visibility 20 000 m.
At 5:46 p.m., the Su-22 nb 3818 took off. The flight to the zone was led by the pilot at an altitude of 600 m. In the zone, due to the complete cloud cover, ie 10/10 and the prevailing snowstorm, the pilot asked for an altitude of up to 2,000 m. Cloud cover was entered in the official documents 6/10. The problem is that the exercise was performed according to DZWA (Daily Normal Atmospheric Conditions), and here the maximum cloud cover could be 6/10. It should be noted, however, that the weather did not have a decisive influence on the accident.
Eventually, the pilot gained a height of 4,000 m (upper cloud base 3,800 m). The pilot reported the commencement of the simple pilotage and obtained approval from KL. After some time, in the area of the north-eastern zone, the weather conditions improved (there was a large enough hole in the clouds) and the pilot asked for permission to perform exercise 24 (improving the technique of medium pilot figures) and KL issued this consent. The pilot made a complete set of medium pilot figures; coup, noose, Imelman. After their completion, he noticed a significant deviation from the chosen direction of flight. The left-bank improved the plane in the zone. The plane was at an altitude of 5,000 m at a speed of 570 km / h. The pilot led the plane to a left rollover. While on his back, the pilot realized that the plane was already at non-critical angles of attack. He gave the stick back, wanting to change the unfavorable angles. However, there was no proper reaction of the plane to the pilot's actions. The plane was already out of control and was rolling from wing to wing while increasing the angle of descent. It was around 6:30 p.m.
The pilot made only the right decision and fired himself at an altitude of about 3,000 m. While opening the parachute, the pilot suffered from abrasions on the skin of his face and right ear. The wind took the pilot 8 kilometers away. He safely landed 3 km north of Złotów and 4 km from Stawnica. At 19:09 the pilot was picked up by the crew of the Mi-2 rescue helicopter from Mirosławiec Airport.
Meanwhile, the plane without a pilot was gaining speed towards the ground and hit it at a speed of about 900 km / h into a farmland. There was a large explosion, although the plane was unarmed. The impact was made at an angle of 20-30 degrees with a tilt to the right wing, about 80 degrees. At the site of impact, a several-meter-long crater was created. Parts of the plane disintegrated within a radius of about 500 m. The fire brigade, the police and the army appeared at the crash site. The plane crashed in a distance of 500-700 m from the nearest buildings of Franciszkowo. According to witnesses, the plane damaged the medium voltage power line, because at 6:29 p.m. the light in the town of Nowy Dwór went out.
The plane was awaiting the return of the plane at the airport when information arrived that the plane had crashed. An alarm group (Mi-2 helicopter) was taken up in the air. Everyone was very nervous and there was only one question - Is the pilot alive? The aircraft maintenance records were immediately secured. The aircraft technician was calm in this respect, because the documentation was carried out in an exemplary manner. Soon, happy information - The pilot is alive and in good shape. A stone fell from everyone's heart. After several minutes, the Mi-2 helicopter with a pilot on board lands at the airport. The pilot went to the hospital for tests and unsafe convalescence. Later he returned to flying.
The accident was investigated by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee of the Air Force and Air Defense Command. In the airport hangar, the shapes of the plane are drawn in a 1: 1 scale. Most of the elements of the plane were transported. When the commission's representatives arrived for the wreckage inspections, they focused mainly on one element - the worm mechanism of the angular unfolding of the wings. The committee members did not even question the aircraft technician.
According to the results of the commission, the most likely cause of the accident was a pilot error, which consisted in allowing the aircraft to exceed the critical angle of attack during the rollover and in skilful handling of the problem. The commission only confirmed the pilot's right decision to leave the plane.
Subjectively.
Significantly, the Commission used the statement; "most probable". The problem was that the Commission only had at its disposal the wreckage and interviews with the pilot, as the on-board recorder was damaged 4 minutes before the pilot ejected. The commission also concluded that the plane was operational until the end and that it did not break down. However, I would like to point out that if the on-board recorder has failed, then maybe the control system has also failed. It is little known to the public that the planes hidden in the new shelter-hangars were constantly exposed to moisture, because these rooms were damp. Among other things, it was dealt with in such a way that during longer breaks and periods of high humidity, CWM blocks were removed and placed in warm and dry rooms. Before the flights, blocks were installed on the planes. It can be said that in the W accident, 1/3 of the aircraft were rendered unusable due to total or limited malfunction (electronics and more).
It can also be presumed that due to the prevailing weather conditions, the airframe may partially iced. But probably the angle of the wings was incorrect in relation to the flight parameters at this stage of the flight. After a correctly performed series of figures, the plane should be on course, and the pilot noticed a significant deviation.
The commission concluded that the pilot's behavior was adequate to the level of his training. The crux of the matter was that the young TS-11 Iskra pilot switched to a much larger and heavier Su-22 attack aircraft. A huge difference. The pilot, General Jerzy Gotała, recalled that he had to delete a young pilot who, after the TS-11, was unable to control the Su-22. The lack of an intermediate plane was noticed already in the second half of the 80's. It was hoped that this gap would be filled by I-22 Iris. It did not happen.
It is not revealing that the pilots spent too little time in the air. The average good annual flight time was then around 50-60 hours (from take-off to landing). And it is not about long hours of autopilot flights. A good pilot is one who would have 300-400 take-off operations a year, plus the same number of tasks over the training ground. Nobody has learned to fly just by looking at an airplane.
A politically exploited accident.
The mid-90s was a period of nervous movements on the Polish political scene, in the army and in the Polish Armaments Industry, including the Aviation Industry. In 1993, the Red Army managed to move out of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It is a pity the agents have not been removed. The Commonwealth strove to join NATO structures, with great help from the Polish diaspora from the USA. It is hard to believe today, but our aviation industry was at a relatively good level. It definitely dominated the aviation industry of Brazil, which at the present time (2017) is one of the powerhouses in this field. After the collapse of CCCP, we lost our main market. Communists transformed into capitalists had no idea how the free market worked and were unable to provide new markets. Successive governments have left the companies to themselves. Particular interests began to decide. Trade unions were blamed for failure. There were deep divisions among Polish designers and manufacturers.
Throughout 1995, there were four air accidents in the Polish Army, which killed three pilots. On January 24, 1996, the Iryda plane crash took place for the second time in the history of the I-22 Program. Machine no. ANA 02-03 during the flight near Radom completely crashes, burying two pilots. They died with the death of the aviator; major T. Chudzik and captain J. Mieszkowski - Honor their memory!
The press was fed up. Appropriate sentences were passed depending on the political options. In one, the journalists were in agreement and fully consciously wrote - "These were the mistakes of the pilots." They added - "in 70-80% of cases it was the pilot / crew who was to blame." Neither of them thought about whether it is possible to shoot figures of middle and higher pilotage on a combat aircraft. After all, a combat plane is a boxer, not a ballerina. They do not know that the pilot's actions are only the tip of the iceberg, and that his mistake is only the culmination of mistakes made earlier by others.
The training program at that time was a patchwork of the CCCP program, supplemented by native ideas. In the Polish military doctrine, it was important to use it in the activities of the DOL. MiG-21 (from 1964) and Lim-2/5/6 planes used them as standard. Su-22 not much anymore, because this task was performed only by a few, the most experienced. SAAB JAS-39 Gripen machines operate in a similar doctrine to date. F-16 planes - no.
The aforementioned catastrophes had wide repercussions in the Polish aviation world. In general, it can be assumed that there were two antagonizing groups. One is focused around PZL Mielec and the Institute of Aviation (PZL I-22), and the other is around PZL Okęcie (PZL-130 Orlik). It is also true that I-22 Irida had much worse press. All actual and imaginary faults were pointed out. The PZL-130 Orlik, on the other hand, had a good press and it was impossible to find the faults of this machine in it.
These antagonisms arose when the WSB (Multitasking Combat Airplane) program was taking shape, which was to replace the previously used equipment from the East. In fact, Poland had two designs to choose from; Lockheed Martin F-16 (ex General Dynamics) supported by the "Warsaw group" and SAAB JAS-39 Gripen supported by the "Mielec group".
More about Lockheed F-16 in the article "Choosing Lockheed Martin F-16 for the Polish Armed Forces." 2005.
More about the SAAB JAS-39 Gripen in the article "Gripen multi-role combat aircraft for Poland." 2008.
The Mirage-2000 was too expensive for us, and so was the F-15. Being in a fever, the Moscow agency proposed; Su-27, Su-30, MiG-29 M (As it turned out after another 15 years, today they are holding the top, because Su-22 and MiG-29 will be in the Commonwealth for many years to come).
In the second half of the 1990s, we believed that one of the Polish plants would take part in the construction of WSB. Both PZL Okęcie and PZL Mielec had considerable experience and free processing capacity.
Not only that, the accumulating problems have not been resolved, the Ministry of Defense unexpectedly has arbitrarily suspended any activities in the I-22 Iryda Program and it has been announced that Poland will purchase Alpha Jet aircraft, which are no longer used by Germany. After such information, the storm turned into an earthquake. The entire defense industry threatened to strike, the Ministry of National Defense withdrew from the idea. The ideas of purchasing Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighter planes added to the fire, and the PZL-230 Scorpion project was pulled out like a rabbit from a hat, which, being in the duck configuration, without the fly-by-wright system, had no chance.
Everything I wrote down happened in the 90's. The Su-22 planes are still (2017) in service with the Polish Army, based in Świdwin. And they will probably be there for a long time. The Su-22 cannot participate in joint NATO exercises because they lack the appropriate equipment or even weapons.
Compiled by Karol Placha Hetman. Consultation Andrzej Graczyk