Śmigłowce dla Wojska Polskiego. 2018r.

Kraków 2018-09-14

Helicopters for the Polish Army.

PZL W-3 nb 0818. 2007. Photo by Karol Placha Hetman
PZL W-3 nb 0818. 2007. Photo by Karol Placha Hetman

PZL W-3 nb 0819. 2011. Photo by Karol Placha Hetman
PZL W-3 nb 0819. 2011. Photo by Karol Placha Hetman

PZL W-3 nb 0506 2014. Photo by Karol Placha Hetman
PZL W-3 nb 0506 2014. Photo by Karol Placha Hetman

For nearly 30 years, the Republic of Poland has not been able to cope with the solution to the purchase of helicopters for the Polish Army. The case is so surprising that we have a PZL Świdnik plant with a 60-year tradition. And also a second plant that also builds excellent helicopters. The fact is that both plants are not owned by Poland or even the majority of Polish capital. This situation is the result of many years of liquidation of the Polish economy, and even state structures, by post-communist and later Masonic-liberal governments. The facts are devastating and even thousands of articles in the Polish-language media will not be able to drown out these facts.

The value of a given army is demonstrated by its strength not in times of relative peace, but in times of actual crisis. And such situations have already occurred in the recent history of the Republic of Poland. We mean the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, where helicopter attack and transport groups joined the fight. The Polish Army then gained valuable experience. The strongest link was the Polish Soldier. However, the decision-makers acted chaotically, not very consistently, and most importantly, they did not develop a strategy for the further development of the Polish Army, especially in the field of transport and attack helicopters.

Mil Mi-8 and PZL W-3 Sokół helicopters were sent to Iraq. It quickly turned out that support in the form of the Mil Mi-24 D attack helicopters had to be sent, and the PZL Sokół helicopters had to be retrofitted to the first variant of the PZL W-3 Głuszec.

It was a bit different in Afghanistan. There, the Mil Mi-17 and Mil Mi-24 helicopters were sent. As a matter of urgency, 7 Mil Mi-17 helicopters were first purchased second-hand, and a little later another 5 Mil Mi-17 helicopters. This time the PZL W-3 Sokół / Głuszec helicopters were not dispatched. For several years now, Mil Mi-24 helicopters have not had precision armament in the form of guided missiles. Their stock has run out.

The above experiences have clearly shown that the Polish Army needs an assault and transport helicopter, at least one of the size of the PZL W-3 Sokół / Głuszec, with appropriate equipment and armament. To sum up, the Polish Army was poorly prepared for this type of hardware conflicts.

At the turn of 2006/2007, attempts were made to launch the so-called National Helicopter Program (NŚP). In 2007, as part of the NPŚ, it was planned to acquire a total of 85 helicopters for the Polish Army in 2008–2018, of which 79 in 2013–2018. The program was blocked by freemasonry because it was based on Polish constructions and Polish productions.

When the NPŚ program was blocked, the General Staff was finishing the modernization plan of the Polish Army for the period 2009-2018. At that time, the demand for about 160 machines was reported, which should replace almost 70% of the then state. But our economy was unable to bear such an effort. That is why a more realistic program was developed, referring to the acquisition of about 50 helicopters in 2011-2018. The priority was the helicopters: VIP (6 machines), SAR (8 machines for the Navy), transport (24 machines), impact helicopters (12 machines). Theoretically, the purchase of such a number of machines was then estimated at PLN 10 billion. At the same time, the contract for the delivery of PZL SW-4 Puszczyk school helicopters was delayed.

In the years 2006–2011, a total of 12 Mil Mi-17 machines (7 used, 5 new) were acquired, i.e. the equivalent of one transport squadron. In total, in 2006–2012, contracts were concluded for 43 helicopters - 24 PZL SW-4, 12 Mil Mi-17 and 7 PZL W-3. They were delivered in 2006–2013. Then, in 2013–2014, 5 more ultralight Cabri G2 machines were purchased.

In the spring of 2012, the Ministry of National Defense announced a tender for helicopters for everything. First, 26 machines were declared to be purchased. The purchase of one platform in three variants was considered: transport, anti-submarine (ZOP) and search and rescue (CSAR).

Unexpectedly, in September 2012, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced that not 26 machines, but as many as 70 helicopters would be purchased for the needs of the armed forces. Still based on one type. It was one of the thousands of promises made by the liberal prime minister, who poured them out of his sleeve. Officially, the Armament Inspectorate announced the correction of the procedure on its website only in February 2013. Even then, it was unofficially known that the winner was the Airbus Caracal helicopter.

For the fictitious tender, in addition to the consortium "EC725 Caracal Polska Program" composed of: Airbus Helicopters, Heli Invest Sp. z o.o., offering the EC725 / H225 Caracal helicopter, two more platforms were offered: a consortium consisting of: Sikorsky Intermational Operations Inc., Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Polskie Zakłady Lotnicze Sp. z o. o., offering S-70i Black Hawk helicopters and S-70B Seahawk sea helicopters manufactured in Poland, and PZL-Świdnik S.A. Communication Equipment Factory, offering AW 149 helicopters.

The tactical and technical requirements (WTT), which were written for the needs of the tender, remained a mystery. They have not been formally disclosed, but the fact that different helicopters such as the AW 149 and H225 may have participated in the procedure is a poor indication of the transparency of the procedure.

At the same time, the privatization of the aviation sector in Poland, including the plants producing helicopters, was underway. First, on March 16, 2007, 100% of shares in Polskie Zakłady Lotnicze Sp. z o.o. was purchased from ARP S.A. by United Technologies Holdings S. A. (UTH), a United Technologies Corporation (UTC). Within the UTC group, a company of the UTC group - Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation started direct cooperation with PZL Mielec. Then, in 2010, WSK PZL Świdnik S.A. were eventually acquired by AgustaWestland, belonging to the Finmeccanica holding, and now Leonardo. Of course, the privatization of the plants had a huge impact on the pending proceedings. Both plants, understandably, signed up for the tender. Their competitor was Airbus Helicopters.

It is worth mentioning here that the Polish Army did not agree with the position of the Ministry of National Defense. The military saw the need only to replace the Mil Mi-8 and Mil Mi-17 helicopters, and this is because smaller helicopters are produced domestically. They wanted a helicopter with a rear loading ramp. The offered Caracal does not have it. The Polish Army counted on Sikorsky S-92 or NHI NH-90 helicopters. But the decision-makers did not notice this request. The time requirements set by the Polish side meant that these machines were not offered. There was also the question of price, but in this case the purchases could be stretched over time.

After choosing the Caracal helicopter, it turned out that they became very expensive and for PLN 13.4 billion you can buy only 50 pieces. The offset was to consist in the production of main rotor blades at WZL No. 2 in Łódź, a plant that specializes in the repair of military helicopters. Airbus withdrew from the possible final assembly offer for helicopters in Łódź.

In May 2016, in the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, the Minister of National Defense, Antoni Macierewicz, presented an audit report at the Ministry of National Defense. It was devastating for the former rulers - the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party. Antoni Macierewicz said, inter alia, to the former rulers - "What has Poland done to you, that you left her so defenseless?" And further - “Planning the development of the armed forces was based on a fixed number of battalions capable of direct defense operations. Neither the data on the increase in the enemy's hypothetical potential nor the issue of recovering losses in the course of possible defense activities was taken into account. Such planning can hardly be called mere incompetence. It was a deliberate act to the detriment of the Polish state. " The head of the Ministry of National Defense said that in 2010–2015 PLN 50 billion was spent on the implementation of the development programs of the Armed Forces. - “At the same time, none of the programs on which PLN 50 billion was spent at that time, neither then nor to this day, has been completed. What happened to this money, I ask you from the PO and PSL, where did PLN 50 billion go? Let us add that from this amount only PLN 2 billion a year went to Polish enterprises, the rest was spent on foreign enterprises. " And further "- The modernization program of the armed forces was misleading the public from the very beginning," said the head of the Ministry of National Defense. The minister said that the decisions of his predecessors in the Ministry of National Defense - Bogdan Klich and Tomasz Siemoniak on the definition of procedures for acquiring weapons and military equipment did not serve the transparency of spending public funds, but were an instrument of deliberate and deliberate blurring of traces and blurring the responsibility of those planning and carrying out purchases.

On October 4, 2016, the decision to abandon the acquisition of Caracal multi-role helicopters was announced. "Poland recognizes the completed negotiations of the offset agreement with Airbus Helicopters regarding the contract for the purchase of Caracal helicopters, further talks are pointless." - the Ministry of Development announced on Tuesday, October 4, 2016 in a press release.

The Polish-language media see only one culprit - the Minister of National Defense, Antoni Macierewicz. They forget that the management and employees of the PZL Świdnik and Sikorsky-Mielec plants objected first to the entire tender. The anti-Polish actions include the pressure to acquire the Caracal medium multi-role helicopter, which was also supposed to be an attack helicopter. Its function as an assault machine was and is illusory. As was the case with the Mi-8, which was forcefully armed with unguided missiles in the 1960s. The same was done with the Mi-17-1V, which ended up in the state of the Polish Army. In many respects, the purchase of Caracal helicopters was not purposeful. Even aside from the gigantic price and quantity of machines to be acquired. The promoted thesis about using it for countless tasks was misleading the public.

Presenting the matter of new helicopters only in the light of lost time is untrue. Contrary to popular media opinion, there is no time pressure, because the Polish Army is temporarily not involved in any operations abroad, where operational helicopters are necessary. The subject of wasted time is raised only by those centers which lobby for a given helicopter and lose particular interests and… bribes.

The change of power in the Republic of Poland to the rule of the United Right has led to an improvement in the situation. However, let us not delude ourselves that in one term of office it will be possible to repair what was so systematically destroyed. However, the improvement is visible for the Polish Air Force. Medium and small planes were acquired to transport the most important persons in the State, which for 20 years had not been done by previous Governments. Though Freemasonry has even brought a lawsuit.

What's next?

As a country with extensive experience in the field of construction and production of helicopters, we do not have to rely on purchases of equipment from abroad, from plants that could impose an embargo on the supply of spare parts to the Republic of Poland at any time.

It is in the interest of our nation to regain total influence on the PZL Świdnik plant. Maintaining the production of PZL SW-4, PZL W-3 Sokół / Głuszec helicopters and starting work on the PZL Sokół Long / Max helicopter.

In a situation where the scenario of recovery of Świdnik fails, plan "B" includes the acquisition of domestic-built helicopters. At the end of 2016, several declarations were made from the government regarding the acquisition of new machines. Among others, the Ministry of National Defense declared the purchase of 10 Black Hawk helicopters from Mielec (2 in 2016 and 8 in 2017) for special forces. To increase the chance of finalizing the agreement, the Minister of National Defense, Antoni Macierewicz, made all actions in this matter secret. Nevertheless, the procedure, conducted in "complete confidentiality, for orders of vital importance to the security of the state," was blocked by freemasonry.

In 2017, two procedures were launched for the purchase of helicopters for the Navy and Special Forces. Assault machines have also become a priority. The problem is that the change in the position of the Minister of National Defense on January 9, 2018 does not help to maintain the liquidity of the proceedings.

Currently (2018), the Armament Inspectorate is conducting procedures for the purchase of 8 machines for Special Forces and the same number of ZOP (anti-submarine) machines with the possibility of carrying out rescue missions for the Navy (CSAR). On January 18, 2017, the Minister of National Defense, Antoni Macierewicz, informed that the purchase of helicopters as part of an urgent operational need was to cover eight machines for the Special Forces and eight for the Navy (16 in total). The forecasts that the contract (s) will be concluded in less than a year, and the first machines will be in mid-2018 at the latest, were optimistic, was impossible to achieve. Not because there was no will, but because the business arrangements are still working.

At the beginning of March 2018, an adjustment was made to the WTT. The idea was to make the delivery dates of new helicopters more realistic, as well as the issues of inspections, servicing and repairs.

The current choice of a medium-sized helicopter is extremely important because it will set the direction for at least the next 50 years. As it was with the WSB Lockheed F-16 Jastrząb planes. The technology from the East should definitely be abandoned.

Helicopters for SAR tasks.

Currently, SAR tasks use PZL W-3 RM Anakonda helicopters, which are criticized by some. Attention is drawn to the possibility of evacuating only 3 people and the fact that the helicopter is insufficient for offshore operations. Only practice shows otherwise. It is a fiction to create one SAR aviation base. Even the best helicopter will be ineffective when it has over 500 km to the survivors, because it is a loss of over 2 hours. The Polish Baltic Sea requires three SAR bases, with one helicopter on duty in each. Then the time for the expected help will never exceed 60 minutes. In addition, the crews on duty can support each other.

The task of fighting submarines should be a secondary task. The Baltic Sea, being inland, is not an attractive reservoir for this type of activity. In addition, the helicopter is not the only weapon against this type of threat.

AW 101 (PZL Świdnik) and H225M Caracal (a consortium of Airbus Helicopters and Heli Ivest) are proposed. In the maritime program, the two-tasking requirement is currently met by only the largest, i.e. AW 101 Merlin from Leonardo Helicopters, operated in the ZOP version with the option of carrying out SAR tasks by the Royal Navy. So in very difficult conditions and far from the shores. It is a very high performance machine. It is powered by three motors. However, it is very expensive. However, with such a small number of ordered machines, it is difficult to expect to negotiate a large support for PZL Świdnik. The second helicopter is the H225M Caracal. The problem is that so far this helicopter has been operated as a SAR machine or as a ZOP machine. So there is no version for both missions at once. Some emphasize that for the present leadership of the United Right, this will be a proposal that is difficult to accept due to the previous would-be tender.

In such a situation, it should be concluded that the WTTs for this type of helicopter are too strict. Let us recall that the PZL I-22 Iryda program was rolled in this way, which was to have combat capabilities such as the General Dynamics F-16 multi-role fighter.

Helicopter for special forces.

Special forces are almost a Polish specialty. We have five special units. Probably the purchase of helicopters especially for these formations results from the commitments made as part of detailed arrangements in NATO. Black Hawk (Sikorsky and PZL Mielec), AW 101 (PZL Świdnik) and H225 Caracal (Airbus Helicopters and Heli Ivest) helicopters are offered. And I think someone got involved in WTT again, because Black Hawk is a completely different class than the AW 101 and H225 Caracal.

Some experts in the subject claim that helicopters for special forces are the most technically advanced machines. They are to have all the communication systems available in the world and all encrypted. They are to have offensive and defensive weapons. Possibility of electronic warfare, radar stations and much more. In a word, they should dive and fly into space. In fact, the requirements of special forces for helicopters are much more prosaic. One coded, modern communication system, unlimited flight at night and in difficult weather conditions, the ability to take a team with all the necessary equipment and weapons, high speed and range, the ability to quickly land and evacuate, medical equipment.

The program code-named Kruk.

The program, codenamed Kruk, is a future attack helicopter capable of passing through massive enemy defenses and effectively combating armored forces. We are talking about at least 32 machines. It is intended to completely replace the Mil Mi-24 helicopters, which have long lost their ability to effectively combat armored weapons due to the lack of guided missiles. The Mil Mi-24 helicopter was left with only a menacing appearance, which was not without significance in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Raven is becoming a priority today, partly at the expense of other programs.

The program of equipping the army with shock machines under the Kruk program is only in the analytical and conceptual phase, so the road to contract and deliveries seems to be a long way off.


Haste is a bad advisor, especially when spending a lot of public money. Take your time, but this does not imply no action. It seems realistic to receive new helicopters in 2022.

The statement by the Masonic press is very interesting, "that the construction of military helicopters and airplanes is the domain of the strongest economies in the world." Then Brazil is a world power, because it builds such airships. Antoni Macierewicz has said many times that "the construction and production of a helicopter with the" made in Poland "sign is quite a real prospect. The former Minister of National Defense emphasized that he is a supporter of the purchase of equipment manufactured in Poland. The president of PZL Świdnik, Krzysztof Krystowski, has repeatedly emphasized that Leonardo is able to provide the Polish Army with what it needs, and not what the company wants to sell.

How does Freemasonry throw the Republic of Poland at its feet?

According to freemasonry, the process of selecting and purchasing helicopters for the Polish Army is very complicated, long, requiring the study of thousands of documents, the preparation of another thousand pages of documents, often carrying out own tests, determining parameters, valuating material items and "know how". In a word, a path through torment.

Well, unless the helicopter is lobbied by them and when the contract is concluded, they will get a briefcase with one million untaxed dollars.

The case is not that complicated at all. The offered helicopters are certified either from the USA or from Western Europe. The contracting authority develops the WTT based on its priorities and what the opponent has at his disposal. You do not buy a bow-tie sword and an anti-elephant slingshot. Producers are invited to submit a tender. For various reasons, not all manufacturers are willing to bid. There should also be no amount reserved in the state budget. Because the bidder will immediately count how much can be squeezed from the buyer with the declared number of machines. After all, no one will offer Kowalski a Mercedes, when he has 50,000 zlotys and has no creditworthiness.

Added to this is the masonic criticism of everything that is Polish, that is produced by a Polish worker. That the PZL Sokół helicopter is outdated equipment, but none of them will say that about the Black Hawk, because it is a workhorse around the world.

It is not true that the fault in the negotiations always lies with Poland. The information available from the Ministry of National Defense shows that the cases are different. When a new person is introduced to the negotiations by the tenderer, without a certificate of access to classified information, interviews are then suspended until that certificate is issued. And this procedure is grass. Other case: The tenderer becomes acquainted with the WTT and it appears that at some point he does not know whether his helicopter will meet this requirement. It sometimes needs weeks to check if it is possible.

Therefore, the focus should be on the helicopters being built here in the country. Cooperation between the Department of Armaments and production plants should be tightened.

The question is also raised - "If we choose Black Hawk helicopters, will the US provide advanced equipment." They are deliberately forgetting that the US provided us with the WSB Lockheed F-16 Hawk with the most modern equipment, so there is no fear that we might not get the modern equipment for the Black Hawk.

Written by Karol Placha Hetman